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Despite the sustained effort of about forty years to analyze Subjacency, to 
date, there has been no principled account, with the most recent attempts 
faring not much better than the initial proposals. It is also significant that the 
seeming arbitrariness of Subjacency has been used to argue that syntax 
could not have evolved gradually: One does not see why evolution would 
target a grammar with Subjacency, when its contribution to grammar is not 
transparent, let alone its contribution to survival. As put in Lightfoot (1991), 
“Subjacency has many virtues, but … it could not have increased the 
chances of having fruitful sex”. This article turns the argument around, and 
proposes that subjecting syntax to a gradualist evolutionary approach can in 
fact shed light on the existence of Subjacency effects. It thereby offers a 
reconstruction of how communicative benefits may have been involved in 
shaping the formal design of language.  
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1. What is Subjacency? 
 
Move(ment) plays a crucial role in the mainstream theory of syntax, Minimalism 
(e.g., Chomsky 1995) and its predecessors alike. So, for example, wh-question 
formation is considered to involve movement of the wh-word or phrase from its 
thematic (underlying) position to the left periphery of the sentence (in English). 
The following examples illustrate: 
 
(1) What do penguins eat <what>?  
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(2) What does Peter think [CP penguins eat <what>]? 
 
(3) Who(m) did Peter walk with <who(m)>? 
 
(4) Who(m) did you say [CP Peter walked with <who(m)>]? 
 
In (1)–(2) it is assumed that the wh-word what originates after eat as a 
complement/theme/object of eat (cf. echo questions such as Penguins eat what?), 
and that it subsequently moves to the front of the sentence, to the position of the 
specifier of CP. (The ‘<>’ notation is used here to represent the original (pre-
Move) copy of the wh-word.) Similar considerations hold of the wh-word 
‘who(m)’ in the examples (3)–(4). It is important to note here that wh-movement 
conceived in this way can sometimes apply long-distance, that is, it can cross 
clause (CP) boundaries, as is the case in (2) and (4).   
 In his dissertation, Ross (1967) noted that there are many types of syntactic 
islands, that is, constructions out of which it is not possible to move.1 One such 
island is coordination — as illustrated with the minimal pairs below, it is not 
possible to move a wh-word out of a conjunct: 
 
(5) What did Peter eat ham with <what>?  
 
(6)    * What did Peter eat ham and <what>? 
 
(7) Who(m) did Peter see Richard with <who(m)> yesterday? 
 
(8)    * Who(m) did Peter see Richard and <who(m)> yesterday?  
 
Notice that the echo versions below are grammatical, suggesting that the 
problem lies with the movement itself, rather than with the semantics.  
 
(9) Peter ate ham and what? 
 
(10) Peter saw Richard and who(m)? 
 
In addition, movement out of subjects (11) is less acceptable than movement out 
of objects (12), and subjects are for that reason also regarded as islands:  
  
(11) ?* Who did [NP your loyalty to <who>] appeal to Mary? 
 
(12) Who did Bill question [NP your loyalty to <who>]? 
 
The following examples introduce some additional islands: Wh-Island, where wh-
extraction is prohibited out of another wh-clause (13); Complex NP Constraint, 
where Move is prohibited out of a noun phrase which includes a clause, either a 
nominal complement clause (14), or a relative clause (15); and Adjunct Island, 
where Move is prohibited out of an adjunct/adverbial (16): 
 
                                                       
    1 “We say that a phrase is an ‘island’ if it is immune to the application of rules that relate its 
parts to a position outside of the island” (Chomsky 1980: 194).  
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(13) ?* Which book did you ask John [CP where Bill bought <which book>]? 
 
(14) ?* What did Bill reject [NP the accusation [CP that John stole <what>]]? 
 
(15) ?* Which book did Bill visit [NP the store [CP that had <which book> in 
 stock]]? 
 
(16) ?* What did Peter retire [CP after Mary said <what>?] 
 
 One of the central questions of syntactic theory, if not the central question, 
has been what differentiates constructions that allow Move from those that do 
not. Typically, the assumption among syntacticians is that islandhood, that is, 
restrictions on Move, is the marked case, in need of explanation. This assumption 
has led to the expectation that there is some (abstract) principle of syntax, such as 
Subjacency, which accounts for all or most of the island effects. Syntacticians 
have thus concentrated on characterizing and defining the principles that are 
taken to constrain Move, including Subjacency.2 About forty years after Ross’ 
dissertation, no real progress has been made on this front, however: There is still 
no principled characterization of islandhood.3  
 Most accounts stipulate which syntactic nodes (S, NP, CP, DP, etc.), and/or 
which combination of nodes, and/or nodes in which syntactic positions, 
constitute obstacles to Move (barriers/bounding nodes/phases). The classic 
accounts are Huang (1982), Lasnik & Saito (1984), and Chomsky (1986). To take 
one example, very roughly speaking, one can account for the Complex NP 
constraint (14)–(15) by assuming that the NP is an obstacle to Move, to use 
neutral terminology. But the NP proves an obstacle only in conjunction with a 
clause, given that movement is otherwise possible either out of a clause as in (2) 
and (4) or out of an NP as in (12). Very roughly speaking again, one needs to 
assume that clauses and NPs are both obstacles, but that the wh-phrase can jump 
over one obstacle (at a time), even though not over two. So far, so good. But then 
                                                       
    2   Some more recent accounts (e.g., Boeckx 2008), adopt a pluralistic view of islandhood, that 
is, a view that islandhood is a result of the application of various principles, not just one 
unified principle such as Subjacency. Under this view, a unification of all islandhood is not 
pursued or expected (see fn. 7 for further discussion). In fact, Boeckx considers that the 
result of each Merge is an island, although typically not an absolute island. For him, island-
hood results if too much checking affects a single item. If features to be checked can be 
distributed over more than one item, such as may be the case with movement leaving a 
resumptive pronoun, then islandhood is voided or weakened (p. 208). In other words, the 
islands are relativized to the amount of checking relations established and their 
configurations. Boeckx does acknowledge, however, that adjoined structures “have a 
freezing effect” on movement (p. 233), as well as that the islandhood of coordination is not 
captured by his, or any other syntactic theory (p. 237). Napoli (1993: 401, 409) likewise notes 
that “while Subjacency accounts for the Complex NP Constraint, […] the Subject Condition, 
and the wh-islands, it cannot account for the ungrammaticality of movement out of 
coordinate structures and out of adverbial clauses”. The islandhood of coordination and 
adjunction is the central focus of my article.  
    3 This is not meant, in any way, to denigrate the quality of research done within this 
approach. For even when one follows an ill-fated hypotheses, one gathers invaluable data 
and insights along the way. But however fine and ingenious this research may have been 
otherwise, and however great its contributions, in my view, it has not yielded progress on 
this particular front, that is, it has not provided a principled account of islandhood.  
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this analysis does not really carry over to other islands. When it comes to the 
Subject island, how does one explain why movement out of the subject NP is 
illicit, while movement out of the object NP is licit? In both cases, the wh-phrases 
seem to be crossing the same number of obstacles. According to Huang (1982), 
this is because the subjects (and adjuncts) are not ‘properly governed’, while 
objects are. In Chomsky’s (1986) version, this is because subjects (and adjuncts) 
are not L-marked, while objects are. The appeal to either proper government or 
L-marking only serves to render objects/complements privileged in this respect, 
implicating the importance of the structural position, in addition to the nature 
and number of nodes crossed. But there is now no real unification of the 
Complex NP island, on the one hand, and subject or adjunct islands, on the other. 
And the problems multiply as one considers additional islands (see, e.g., Postal 
1997, 1998).4  
 Within the Minimalist framework, in which proper government and L-
marking are not available as theoretical postulates, Chomsky (2001, 2008) 
attempts to capture some of the island effects by invoking new Minimalist 
constructs, phases (impenetrable domains), again stipulating that CPs and DPs 
(former NPs) are phases. Boeckx & Grohmann (2007) note that these most recent 
phase-based approaches to islandhood do not improve upon the previous ap-
proaches, and that “phases are in many ways reincarnations of bounding nodes 
and barriers” (p. 216). Belletti & Rizzi (2000) report an interview with Chomsky, 
in which he says that “there is no really principled account of many island 
conditions”. 
 
 
2.  Why There Is No Principled Account of Islandhood 
 
The persistent view of Islandhood/Subjacency (in Minimalism and predecessors) 
considers Move to be a default option, while Subjacency (and other restrictions 
on Move) is treated as a marked option, in need of explanation (Ross 1967, 
Huang 1982, Lasnik & Saito 1984, Chomsky 1986, 2001, Stepanov 2007). To be 
more precise, Move in Minimalism is never completely free but is taken to apply 
only if motivated by a need to check certain (strong uninterpretable) features. But 
once such features are present in the derivation, it is considered that Move 
applies freely, in the sense that it applies unless blocked by some specific 
principle like Subjacency.  
 Significantly, this view fuels the influential language evolution hypothesis, 
according to which Merge (which subsumes Move) was the only evolutionary 
breakthrough for syntax: Once it emerged, it was able to apply freely and 
recursively (Hauser et al. 2002, Chomsky 2005, Fitch et al. 2005). In an attempt to 
reconcile this view with a gradualist approach to syntax, Newmeyer (1991) 
proposes that a grammar with Subjacency was specifically targeted by natural/ 
                                                       
    4  Not only does one have to invoke the nature and number of obstacles, and the syntactic 
position in which they occur, but it is often necessary to characterize some obstacles as weak 
and some as strong, in order to explain variation in grammaticality (see e.g., the discussion 
in  Stepanov 2007). See also fn. 2.  
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sexual selection, over a previous stage of grammar, which presumably had no 
Subjacency. This implies that this previous stage was characterized by a much 
freer Move, and that the ungrammatical examples discussed in Section 1 were 
grammatical in this stage. However, Lightfoot (1991: 69) counters that “Subja-
cency has many virtues, but […] it could not have increased the chances of 
having fruitful sex”. In other words, it is not clear how or why a grammar with 
Subjacency would have been naturally/sexually selected over a grammar with-
out Subjacency. Given these and similar considerations, Berwick (1998: 338–339) 
concludes that “there is no possibility of an ‘intermediate’ syntax between a non-
combinatorial one and full natural language — one either has Merge in all its 
generative glory, or one has no combinatorial syntax at all” (see also Bickerton 
1990, 1998, 2007). This kind of reasoning has led many syntacticians to believe 
that syntax is an all-or-nothing package, which could not have evolved gradual-
ly, and which must have been, in its entirety, a product of one single sudden 
event, possibly one single gigantic mutation.  
 But there is no need for this drastic conclusion. In fact, there is an alter-
native possibility to consider regarding Subjacency (mentioned in, e.g., Cinque 
1978, Postal 1997, Boeckx & Grohmann 2007, Progovac 2009b, in press), that 
islandhood is the default state of syntax. Given this view, permitting Move 
would be a special/marked option. In fact, the constructions that prohibit Move 
are much more numerous and diverse than those that allow it (for a long inven-
tory of additional island constructions, see, e.g., Postal 1997, 1998). Consider, 
again, the constructions which constitute islands to Move: 
 
 Subjects 
(17) ?? Who did [NP your loyalty to <who>] appeal to Mary? 
 
 Wh-Clauses  
(18) ?* Which book did you ask John [CP where Bill bought <which book>]? 
 
 Complex NPs 
(19) ?* What did Bill reject [NP the accusation [CP that John stole <what>]]? 
 
(20) ?* Which book did Bill visit [NP the store [CP that had <which book> in  
 stock]]? 
 
 Adjuncts 
(21) ?* What did Peter retire [CP after Mary said <what>?] 
 
 Conjuncts 
(22)  * What did Peter retire and [CP Mary said <what>?] 
 
Basically, Move is possible only out of (a subset of) complements/objects, for 
example, verbal (non-wh-)complements, whether clausal (23) or nominal (24): 
 
(23) Which book did you tell John [CP that Bill bought <which book>]? 
 
(24) Who did Bill question [NP your loyalty to <who>]? 
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What this means is that constructions which disallow Move (islands) do not form 
a natural class, while those that allow Move, do. If so, then any attempt to 
characterize islandhood/Subjacency in unified terms is doomed to fail. On the 
other hand, it should be possible to formulate a general characterization of non-
island constituents, as suggested in Postal (1997). 5  
 Furthermore, there are additional cases where Move is illicit, and I list 
them here to anticipate the discussion in sections 3 and 4. For example, Move 
does not occur across sentential boundaries, as is well-known, but not discussed 
in the context of  Subjacency: 
 
(25)  * Who did Mary see the movie. It featured <who>?  
 
The idea is that the principles of syntax do not extend across sentence 
boundaries, but it is worth noting here that some sentence-internal boundaries 
resemble the sentential boundaries in this respect.  
 Move is also prohibited from paratactically (loosely) attached (small) 
clauses (26), and from attached bare small clauses (27), the latter example 
subsumable under Adjunct Islandhood:6 
 
(26)  * What nothing ventured, <what> gained?  
 (cf. Nothing ventured, nothing gained.) 
 
(27)  * Where can her having retired from <where>, we finally relax?  
 (cf. Her having retired from MIT, we can finally relax.) 
 
Finally, Move is also prohibited from the so-called Root Small Clauses, that is, 
small clauses used in root contexts, to be discussed further in sections 3 and 4.  
 
(28) *Where her retire from <where>? / *Who(m) retire from MIT?!   
 (cf. Her retire from MIT?!) 
 
With these additional examples, it becomes even clearer that constructions that 
prohibit Move (islands) have no syntactic property in common. It is thus not 
surprising that in spite of all the effort, to date, there has been no principled 
analysis of islandhood/Subjacency, as pointed out in section 1 (see also Belletti & 
Rizzi 2000, Szabolcsi & den Dikken 2003, Boeckx & Grohmann 2007).  
 For all these reasons, it would be prudent to explore an alternative track, an 
approach that takes islandhood to be the default state of syntax, and Move a 
special option, available only in certain privileged constructions.7 In this view, 
                                                       
    5  According to Postal (1997), every English constituent is an island and it is especially difficult 
to provide an account for the Coordinate Structure Constraint, as also noted by Boeckx (see 
fn. 2). Boeckx (2008: 250) embraces Postal’s idea that domains are islands by default.  
    6 A ‘bare’ small clause can be characterized as an embedded small clause whose subject does 
not check structural case (see section 4.1. for various types of small clauses with respect to 
case properties). 
    7 As mentioned in fn. 2, a reviewer points out that another angle is possible, namely, to adopt 
a pluralistic view in which islandhood is a result of several independent principles that 
constrain Move (see, e.g., Boeckx 2008). In addition to not being able to capture the 
Sex and Syntax 
 
 
311 
the question is no longer why Move is impossible out of islands, but rather why 
Move is possible out of certain complements, and indeed why Move is possible 
at all. But, first, one needs to wonder why No Move would be the default state of 
syntax. The next section attempts an answer.  
 
 
3. An Evolutionary Explanation8 
 
I propose that proto-syntax, based on small clauses and one-word utterances, did 
not have Move or subordination (Progovac 2007, 2008, in press).9 Initial clausal 
combinations may have looked like paratactic, impenetrable constructions such 
as the following concatenations of two small clauses:10 
 
(29) a. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. 
 b. Easy come, easy go. 
 c. Monkey see, monkey do. 
 d. Card laid, card played.  
 
Recall from section 2 that such concatenations do not sanction Move (26). The 
following are some additional examples that illustrate the same point:  
 
(30) a.     * How easy come, <how> go?  
 b.     * Who monkey see, <who> do? 
 
In this view, the kind of syntax illustrated in (29)–(30) was primary, while Move 
was an evolutionary innovation. While, in agreement with Newmeyer (1991), this 
proposal advocates a gradualist approach to the evolution of syntax, notice that it 
is the direct opposite of what Newmeyer proposed, which is that the previous 
stage(s) of grammar had no restrictions on Move, and that Subjacency was an in-
                                                                                                                                                      
islandhood of coordination and adjunction, the central topic of this article, this view, as 
noted by the reviewer himself, is also not able to account for the generalization that non-
islands seem to form a natural class. Even though the correlation is not perfect, it still holds 
that if a constituent is not a complement, then it is highly likely to be an island. There are 
many subtleties regarding islandhood, including distinguishing weak from strong islands, 
that my approach does not address, as rightly pointed out by the reviewer. I hope that 
future research will address this question within an evolutionary framework. In the 
meantime, I would like to submit that an evolutionary approach which assumes gradual 
development of syntax is well-equipped to deal with graded stages. In this respect, one 
would need to consider the three stages explored in this article, Adjunction, Coordination, 
and Subordination (see also section 4), as just three idealized points in the evolution of 
language, with transitional stages certainly a possibility.  
    8 As pointed out by Cedric Boeckx, syntactic theories of Subjacency, and locality in general, 
should be compatible with findings in neuroscience and evolutionary biology: “Up to now, 
compatibility with neuroscience and evolutionary biology has been a rather weak constraint 
on theory construction in linguistics” (Boeckx 2008: 4). 
    9 I use the term ‘subordination’ here in a rather narrow sense, to refer to the embedding of 
one clause within another, where the embedded clause serves as the complement of the 
main verb. 
    10 A reviewer points out that analyzing examples in (29) as simple concatenations may be 
problematic. I return to this issue below.  
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novation (section 1).11 In my proposal, islandhood, or lack of Move, characterized 
the previous stage(s) of grammar, while Move was introduced later, probably in 
conjunction with more complex, layered, hierarchical syntax, as well as in con-
junction with specialized functional categories and projections, such as TP and 
CP (section 4).  
 This scenario meshes quite well with Kiparsky’s (1995) account of Indo-
European proto-language clause structure (see also Hale 1987).12 According to 
Kiparsky (1995: 155), a major characteristic of Indo-European syntax, best 
preserved in Sanskrit, Hittite, and Old Latin, was that finite ‘subordinate’ clauses 
were not embedded but adjoined (Watkins 1976, Hock 1989). According to 
Kiparsky, Indo-European proto-language lacked the category of complementizer 
and had no CP or any syntactically embedded sentences. What looked like finite 
subordinate clauses, including relative clauses and sentential complements, were 
syntactically adjoined to the main clause, still exhibiting main clause properties, 
such as topicalization of constituents to clause-initial position. Kiparsky (1995: 
145) calls these adjoined finite clauses ‘embedded root clauses’, for they exhibit 
properties of main clauses, and yet seem to be interpreted as embedded. This is 
exactly the transitional scenario toward developing subordination that I am 
proposing worked for language evolution. Kiparsky further claims that the 
introduction of complementizers coincided with the shift from adjunction to 
embedded subordination, which is in line with Kayne’s (1982) assumption that 
only CPs can function as sentential arguments (see also Holmberg 1986 and 
Taraldsen 1986).   
 A reviewer points out that my analysis of (29) as simple concatenation/ 
parataxis (see also section 4) may be problematic, given some recent analyses of 
correlative constructions of the type illustrated in (31) below: 
 
(31) The more you read, the less you understand.  
 
Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 508) argue that such correlative constructions 
involve a paratactic (quasi-coordinate) syntax with conditional semantics. 
However, den Dikken (2005: 503) counters that their approach “condone(s) a 
mismatch between syntax and semantics” and proposes a syntactically more 
complex derivation. The conditional semantics, however, does not follow even 
from den Dikken’s treatment of correlatives, as he himself acknowledges. But, at 
any rate, this same friction between syntax and semantics seems to carry over to 
my examples in (29).  
 First of all, I would like to suggest that, at least in the case of examples such 
as (29), one is not dealing with a mismatch, but rather with underspecification/ 
vagueness. The paratactic attachment only signals that there is a relationship 
between the two clauses, but it does not specify what that relationship is exactly. 
According to Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 528), parataxis is “grammatically the 
most primitive way to combine linguistic elements, one that leaves the semantic 
                                                       
    11 A similar idea can be found in, for example, Boeckx’s (2008: 244) statement that bounding 
nodes are solutions that the language faculty has developed to ensure that syntactic objects 
are unambiguous.  
    12  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to Kiparsky’s paper.  
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relations among the elements to be determined by their inherent semantic 
possibilities or by pragmatic considerations”. As further discussed in section 4, 
concatenations such as (29) typically rely on iconicity of word order to express 
temporal and/or causal relations, rather than on any syntactic devices (see also 
Stump 1985: 307, Deutscher 2000).  
 Furthermore, the correlative structures in (31) are clearly more complex 
than the paratactic attachment of small clauses in (29), both clause-internally and 
clause-externally. Internally, both clauses in (31) are finite, showing tense and 
agreement, as well as a left-peripheral position before the subject, implicating 
Move, or at least a(n additional) functional projection above TP. In contrast, the 
small clauses in (29) are just that — small clauses which show no tense, no 
agreement, and no Move. Externally, each of the small clauses in (29) can be a 
root construct on its own, not requiring another clause to complete it (e.g., 
Nothing ventured!). This is in contrast to correlative constructions in (31), whose 
individual clauses are clearly dependent (*The more you read), possibly suggesting 
some additional external mechanism of clause cohesion, not available in (29). In 
addition, as pointed out by a reviewer, external ATB movement out of correla-
tives such as (31) is possible: 
 
(32) This is a book that the more you read, the less you understand.  
 
This is not to deny the obvious similarities between the constructions in (29) and 
the correlatives in (31). The correlatives in (31) may represent modern compli-
cations of ancient correlatives, the latter more closely approximated by the 
examples in (29).  
 In his detailed consideration of absolute constructions, such as the 
underlined string in (33) below, which also seem to involve parataxis, Stump 
(1985: 302) concludes that the logical relation between an absolute and its super-
ordinate clause is often determined inferentially. He defines ‘inference’ as 
“anything which is not part of the literal meaning of some expression but which 
language users judge to be part of the intended meaning of that expression” 
(304).  
 
(33) She clapped her hands like a child, her lucid eyes sparkling. 
(Stump 1985: 332)  
 
 The issue of vagueness and underspecification deserves special attention in 
an evolutionary framework. If language developed gradually, then it is to be 
expected that not all the grammatical tools that we use today to express logical 
relations with some precision were available in the previous stages of grammar. 
This should not have prevented our ancestors from speaking in however 
imprecise and underspecified ways. It is also important to keep in mind that, 
however precise we may believe that our language is today, it is still vastly 
underspecified with respect to so many distinctions that could in principle be 
made. The ever increasing precision in what we can express with language, and 
the increasing match between syntax and semantics, may have marked one of the 
directions in which language evolved. But there is no reason to believe that a 
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perfect syntax–semantics match has been achieved, or that it is even desirable to 
achieve.  
 Going back to islands, we can now envision an answer to the question of 
why some constructions still disallow Move (e.g., coordination or adjunction), 
while others facilitate it (subordination). My claim is that our grammars, courtesy 
of gradual evolutionary development, show a range of constructions that fall 
between the two opposites, (i) two completely separate utterances/sentences and 
(ii) syntactically fully integrated expressions. The intermediate possibility is to be 
loosely attached (semi-integrated) into sentential fabric, and this is arguably the 
case with, for example, clausal adjuncts and conjuncts, on which I focus in this 
article (see also the concatenation of small clauses discussed above (29)).13 Only 
the most integrated of constructions (subordination) allow Move across clause 
boundaries.14  
 Clausal conjuncts and adjuncts have been repeatedly noted not to be fully 
integrated into syntactic fabric.15 First, they are often parsed as separate 
intonation phrases (Selkirk 1978, Stowell 1981, Nespor & Vogel 1986, Zec & 
Inkelas 1990), which is consistent with them sitting in semi-integrated, ‘non-
canonical’, syntactic positions, as put in An (2007). Next, adjuncts have been 
analyzed in syntax as merging in a different plane (e.g. Chomsky 2001; see also 
Chomsky 2004), and conjuncts as sitting on parallel planes (Goodall 1987). 
According to Lebeaux (1988), adjuncts can be merged into structure acyclically, 
that is, independently of the main cycle of the derivation. According to Stepanov 
(2001), adjuncts are necessarily Merged post-cyclically, that is, after the cyclic 
portion of the derivation is complete. According to Adger (2003), adjuncts do not 
even involve Merge, but rather an operation distinct from Merge, which can be 
called Adjoin. Chomsky (2004: 117) acknowledges that “there has never […] been 
a satisfactory theory of adjunction”. It is very clear that adjunction and coordi-
nation are not fully integrated into the fabric of syntax. 16  
                                                       
    13 Even though I will not discuss subject islands in this article, it is worth noting that syntactic 
theory recognizes that subjects/specifiers are more loosely integrated than objects/ 
complements in various ways. While their objects/complements are merged directly with 
the verbs (First Merge), subjects/specifiers are typically introduced as sisters to interme-
diate projections (Second Merge). In addition, subjects typically undergo Move out of verbal 
projections, further contributing to their syntactic instability.  
    14  This is not to say that subordination was necessarily one big solid monolithic stage — as 
pointed out repeatedly in this article, sub-stages and transitions may well have existed, and 
may account for a number of present-day constructions which are ambivalent in this respect 
(see, e.g., section 4).   
    15  Note also that both adjuncts (i) and conjuncts (ii) can be instantiated by bare small clauses 
(see also fn. 6, as well as the discussion above regarding absolute constructions). Such bare 
small clauses exhibit subjects without structural case, bearing resemblance to concatenated  
small clauses in (29): 
 
  (i)  He reverted to his old ways, us having left.          (Jackendoff 2002) 
 
  (ii)  I am not going to have any woman rummaging about my house, and me in bed. 
(Jespersen 1954) 
    16  Note also that c-command, the central postulate of syntax, does not seem to extend into 
conjuncts or adjuncts in all cases (see Progovac 2003 for some discussion). With negative 
polarity licensing, it is possible to license the negative polarity item ever in an embedded 
subordinate clause (i), but not in a conjunct clause (ii) or an adjunct clause (iii):  
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 Once again, the question is why human grammars should avail themselves 
of this range of possibilities for clause combination, and moreover such 
‘imperfect’ possibilities, as are coordination and adjunction. According to, for 
example, Traugott & Heine (1991) and Deutscher (2000), grammaticalization of 
subordination (36) typically proceeds through exactly these three stages, 
including parataxis (adjunction) (34) and coordination (35), from least syntactic-
cally integrated to most integrated:17 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
  (i)  Mary did not say [that she ever met Peter].      Subordination 
 
  (ii)     * Mary did not say it, [but she ever met Peter].      Coordination 
    (cf. Mary did not say it but she never met Peter.) 
 
   (iii)    * Mary did not say it, [after she ever met Peter].      Adjunction 
 
  In a similar fashion, Principle C effects, clearly visible with subordination (iv), do not 
seem to extend into conjuncts (v): While she and Mary cannot co-refer in (iv), co-reference is 
possible in (v). The judgment is less clear with an adjoined clause in (vi). To me, as well as a 
native speaker I consulted, it seems that (vi) is slightly better than (iv), but the reviewer, as 
well as an informant of his, ranks it equally ungrammatical as (iv).  
 
  (iv)    * Shei never mentioned [that Maryi is a bartender].     Subordination 
 
  (v)  Shei never mentioned it, [but Maryi is a bartender].    Coordination 
 
  (vi)   ?* Shei never mentioned it, [after Maryi became a bartender]. Adjunction 
 
 Given that both negative polarity and Principle C extend across clause boundaries, I use 
clausal coordination and adjunction here to illustrate c-command effects, just as I use clausal 
subordination. These should thus constitute good minimal pairs.  
  However, there are processes dependent on c-command which nonetheless seem to 
extend into conjuncts, as pointed out by a reviewer: ATB extraction (vii), Principle C into a 
coordinated embedded clause (viii), and bound anaphora (ix): 
 
  (vii) Which book does Peter like and Mary hate?  
 
  (viii) Shei said that John saw Mary*i and Bill saw Sue*i.  
 
  (ix)  Every boyi said that hei is going to play football and there’s nothing you can do  
   to stop himi. 
 
  To complicate matters further, some Principle C effects seem to overlap with the effects 
of the pragmatic precedence principle, which operates across independent sentences (x), 
and can thus not be reduced to c-command (see Progovac 2003 for some discussion):  
 
  (x)    ??? Hei finally arrived. Johni's cousin accompanied him.   
 
  Given this, one is not clear if it is syntactic c-command or pragmatic precedence that 
excludes co-reference in either (viii) or (iv) and (vi). Clearly, this issue deserves further 
investigation. It may be that the (un)grammaticality of these various examples is due to a 
curious interplay of more than one factor, including syntactic c-command and pragmatic 
precedence, whose domains seem to partly overlap. Could it be that an ancient, pragmatic 
principle of precedence got grammaticalized into c-command, which can realize its full 
potential only in the subordination stage?  
    17  The following example may also be seen as involving parataxis, but in a clause-internal 
position: 
 
   (i)  He, as you know, is a linguist. 
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(34)  He is a linguist — (as) you know.      Parataxis 
 
(35)  He is a linguist, and you know it.      Coordination 
 
(36)  You know that he is a linguist.       Subordination 
 
If comparable stages characterized language evolution, with adjunction and 
coordination constituting intermediate steps between separate utterances (no 
syntactic integration, no Move) and subordination (full integration, free(er) 
Move), then such evolutionary ‘tinkering’ left us with multiple possibilities 
which partly overlap in function, that is, with redundant means for expressing 
similar meanings (34)–(36).18,19 In the spirit of Charles Darwin (e.g., Darwin 1964), 
and as elaborated in Jacob (1977), evolution is taken to be a ‘tinkerer’, rather than 
an engineer. Unlike engineering, which designs from scratch, with foresight and 
plan, and with perfection, tinkering involves cobbling together, out of bits and 
pieces that happen to be available, clumsily, with no long-term foresight. 
Evolution is also taken not to throw a good thing away, but to build upon it, or to 
add to it. So, if adjunction and conjunction proved to be useful syntactic 
mechanisms in a proto-syntactic stage (see also section 4), the later stages did not 
have to discard them, but could continue to use them in specialized functions. 
This is also the case with grammaticalization of subordination. As put in Carroll 
(2005: 170f.), “multifunctionality and redundancy create the opportunity for the 
evolution of specialization through the division of labor”. Overlap and (partial) 
specialization are properties of evolutionary tinkering, rather than of optimal 
design.  
 Still, one would like to know what might have been the advantages of each 
stage, which assured its survival? I propose in section 4 that the conjunction stage 
has a clear advantage over the adjunction stage in that it provides more robust 
evidence for Merge, including segmental. But what about subordination — does 
it provide any concrete advantage over either conjunction or adjunction, and 
moreover an advantage that could have been targeted by natural or sexual 
selection? 
 As it turns out, in addition to facilitating Move, subordination also 
provides a recursive mechanism for embedding multiple viewpoints one within 
another, unavailable with either coordination or adjunction, privileging in this 
                                                       
    18  This is not meant to imply that there were exactly three syntactic steps in the evolution of 
language, or that the subordination stage was a single solid stage. Finer sub-stages are very 
likely to have existed, and even modern languages show constructions that are transitional 
in nature, as pointed out throughout this article (see especially section 4). For the purposes 
of this article, it is sufficient to identify these three rough stages.  
    19  Notice that my claim here is not that subordination automatically licenses Move. I am only 
saying that subordination is a necessary condition for Move, not sufficient. Other conditions 
clearly need to be met to allow Move, including the existence of the landing site for Move 
(e.g., CP for wh-movement). Given this, the fact that not all subordinate constructions allow 
Move, but only a subset of them do, is not directly a problem for my analysis, even though it 
raises the question why. The analysis proposed here posits a different question than the 
traditional analyses: The question here is not what non-complements and complement 
islands have in common, the question pursued by Subjacency accounts, but rather how 
complement islands differ from complement non-islands. Exploring this question further 
may give new insights into the nature of Move.  
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respect (39) over (37)–(38): 
 
(37) [As you know,] [as Mary knows,] he is a linguist.  
 
(38)  He is a linguist, [and you know it,] [and Mary knows it].  
 
(39)  You know [that Mary knows [that he is a linguist]].  
 
Only in (39) is it possible to report on one person’s knowledge about another 
person’s knowledge. Thus, if subordination (as well as Move) is an innovation 
resulting from evolutionary tinkering, then subordination would have signifi-
cantly increased the expressive power of language, in a concrete and tangible 
manner, and thus, unlike Subjacency, constitutes a plausible target for natural/ 
sexual selection.  
 In this evolutionary perspective, rather than a system designed from 
scratch in an optimal way, syntax is seen as a patchwork of structures incorpor-
ating various stages of its evolution, giving an impression, or an illusion, of 
Subjacency. It follows that Subjacency is not a principle of syntax, or a principle 
of any kind, but rather just an epiphenomenon. Subjacency or islandhood can be 
seen as the default, primary state of language, due to an evolutionary base of 
language which was without Move. This default state can be overridden in 
certain evolutionarily novel constructions, such as subordination.  
 While this article does not answer the question of how exactly complex 
syntax evolved, or how exactly humans proceeded from an adjunction or con-
junction stage to the subordination stage (see section 4 for the characterization of 
these stages), it at least provides a framework in which these questions can be 
asked, and eventually answered. It also identifies concrete communicative ad-
vantages that subordination has over its more primary counterparts: The increase 
in the expressive power of language, making possible, with syntactic means, the 
recursive embedding of multiple viewpoints one within another. The next section 
characterizes in more detail the three postulated stages, as well as possible ad-
vantages of the coordination stage over the adjunction stage.  
 As kindly put by a reviewer, this article is not only about looking for evo-
lutionary fossils and postulating possible paths of language evolution, but this 
particular evolutionary scenario offers a reconstruction of how communicative/ 
functional benefits may have been involved in the shaping of the formal design 
of language itself (see also Progovac 2008, 2009a).  
 
 
4. Excursus: Hypothesized Evolutionary Stages of Syntax  
 
Based on some present-day constructions, as well as based on the trends in gram-
maticalization processes, one can reconstruct the following three rough stages in 
the evolution of syntax, each of which could have, of course, proceeded through 
sub-stages: 
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(A) Parataxis/Adjunction stage, with no hierarchical structure, 
where prosody/suprasegmentals provide the only glue for 
merger (Jackendoff 1999, 2002). 
(B) Proto-coordination stage, where, in addition to prosody, the 
conjunction provides all-purpose segmental glue to hold the 
utterance together. 
(C) Specific functional category stage, where, in addition to 
prosody, specific functional categories provide specialized 
syntactic glue for clause cohesion, including tense elements and 
subordinators/complementizers. It is in this stage that Move 
seems to become available.  
 
The following subsections explore each of these postulated stages. 
 
4.1. Parataxis/Adjunction Stage  
 
This stage can be characterized by flat concatenation, where the merger of two 
constituents (e.g. two words or two clauses) to form a single constituent does not 
build hierarchical structure, and where it is only intonation and prosody (supra-
segmentals) that hold the constituents together. Some version of this proposal 
can be found in, for example, Dwyer (1986), Bickerton (1990), Jackendoff (1999, 
2002), Burling (2005), Deutscher (2005), Progovac (2007, 2009b).20 According to 
Jackendoff (1999, 2002), adjunction has proto-linguistic flavor, and it can be seen 
as an evolutionary fossil. Adjunction in present-day languages is typically taken 
to involve flat/non-hierarchical structure (cf. Merge vs. Adjoin of Adger 2003, as 
discussed in section 3).  
 Furthermore, Progovac (2007, 2008, 2009a) argues that this adjunction/ 
parataxis stage not only can be found fossilized in several constructions used 
today (such as Nothing ventured, nothing gained, as introduced in section 3, or root 
small clauses discussed below), but that such paratactic constructions provide a 
foundation upon which hierarchical syntax is built.  
 Consider the following instances of Root Small Clauses (RootSCs), that is, 
small clauses used in root contexts: 
 
(40) Me first! Everybody out! Him apologize?! Me worry? Case closed. Problem 
 solved. Point taken.  
 
While RootSCs of (40) are hardly ever a subject of syntactic inquiry, having been 
relegated to the ‘periphery’, similar (but not identical) small clauses (SCs), which 
                                                       
    20 Note in this respect that Jordens (2002) argues that there is a stage in the acquisition of 
Dutch where all constituents are attached by adjunction, and where certain modal verbs and 
negation serve as proto-functional categories. According to Jordens, the stage lacks evidence 
for functional categories, the properties of finiteness are absent, and the ordering in this 
stage is driven by pragmatic/conceptual factors. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing me to this reference. See section 5 for more discussion regarding language acqui-
sition.  
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occur in embedded contexts, have been recognized and studied in syntax.21  
 
(41) He wants [SC everybody out].  He imagined [SC the problem solved].  
 
There are competing analyses of the bracketed SCs in (41), including some that 
ascribe quite complex structure to them (see, e.g., Cardinaletti & Guasti 1995). 
However, the tendency is still, overwhelmingly, to label them ‘SCs’, suggesting 
hesitance to commit to an analysis that renders them projections of their 
predicate, or of something else. In fact, they may be paratactic creations, in which 
subject and predicate are loosely concatenated/adjoined. Uriagereka (2008) looks 
at the embedded SCs such as the ones in (41), and concludes that their structure 
is rather basic, and may involve finite-state syntax, the simplest type of syntax in 
Chomsky’s hierarchy. One of the arguments Uriagereka invokes for the primitive 
nature of (embedded) small clauses is the long-noted observation that these 
clauses do not have an internal source of structural case, and are thus assigned 
case by an external element, the verbs want or imagine in (41).  
 According to Progovac (2006), RootSCs in (40) do not have a structural 
mechanism for assigning case to their subjects, providing another argument that 
they are creations similar to embedded SCs. Since with RootSCs there is no ex-
ternal source of case either (they are not embedded under a verb), their subjects 
surface with what can be analyzed as default case (in the sense of, e.g., Schütze 
2001) — witness the accusative on the pronominal subjects in (40). The 
evolutionary perspective sheds light on the existence of both embedded SCs and 
RootSCs — both can be seen as ‘living fossils’ of a proto-syntactic stage in which, 
presumably, clauses were put together by a process akin to adjunction. 22    
 What is of interest for the considerations of this article is the fact that these 
RootSCs cannot be manipulated by Move, as already pointed out in section 2.23  
 
(42) a.     * Who(m) first? 
 b.     * Where everybody? 
 c.      * To whom him apologize? 
 d.     * What solved? 
                                                       
    21  See Progovac (2006) for surface, structural, and semantic differences between embedded 
ECM small clauses and RootSCs. Structurally, RootSCs are akin to ‘bare’ small clauses in 
that neither has any source of structural case for their subject position (fn. 6; see also section 
3). As Progovac (2006) argues, constructs such as (40) are true RootSCs, rather than TPs/IPs 
which have undergone selective ellipsis/deletion. The arguments against analyzing such 
clauses as TPs/IPs include the (default) accusative case on the subject, the lack of agree-
ment/tense marking, the possible lack of articles even with singular count nouns (e.g., Case 
closed), and the marked interpretation possibilities (such as irrealis, formulaic).  
    22  In biological literature, ‘living fossils’ are defined as species that have changed little from 
their fossil ancestors in the distant past, such as, for example, lungfish (Ridley 1993). 
Bickerton (1990) and Jackendoff (1999, 2002) introduced the idea of language fossils. In 
syntax, one can define living fossils as constructions which exhibit rudimentary syntax/ 
semantics, not accounted for by the principles of modern (morpho)syntax, but which none-
theless show some continuity with it. One postulated syntactic fossil would be RootSCs, as 
discussed above.  
    23  A reviewer points out that (i) is acceptable to him/her, but that it may be elliptical: 
 
  (i)  O.K. — who first? 
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If these are indeed proto-syntactic fossils, then this is consistent with my claim 
that proto-syntax did not have Move. It is also consistent with the more specific 
claim that Move is unavailable in the paratactic stage of grammar, which these 
RootSCs arguably instantiate.  
 Even though they do not permit Move, these small clauses can concatenate, 
where intonation, rather than any functional category, provides the glue holding 
the two clauses together. These kinds of concatenations occur cross-linguistically, 
and are typically preserved in formulaic, proverb-like sayings:24  
 
(43) a. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. 
 b. Easy come, easy go. 
 c. Monkey see, monkey do. 
 d. Card laid, card played. 
 
(44) a. Na  psu rana,     na psu i   zarasla.       Serbian 
     on   dog wound   on dog and healed 
  ‘No big deal!’ 
 b. Preko preče, naokolo bliže.  
  across  shorter around closer   
     ‘Shortcuts are not always best.’ 
 
What I am proposing here is that both clausal combinations such as (43)–(44), 
and predicate–argument combinations in (40), are created by the same type of 
grammar — paratactic grammar. This grammar is exocentric, lacks functional 
categories (e.g., TP, CP), and lacks Move. Also, as pointed out in the following 
sub-section, the same proto-coordinator can sometimes be used both clause 
internally and externally, suggesting that the two followed a similar evolutionary 
path. That is why I believe that the internal structure of these clauses is 
(indirectly) relevant for understanding the structure of clause combination: 
Arguably, both are products of the same exocentric, paratactic grammar.  
 To appreciate the role of prosody/intonation, consider (45) as a report from 
a business trip, with falling intonation rendering these two clauses as two 
separate utterances. 
                                                       
    24  Comparable concatenations are more productive in pidgin languages, such as in No money, 
no come (e.g., Winford 2006). Bickerton (1990) in fact considers that pidgin languages are 
indicative of our ability to tap into the proto-linguistic stage. However, in his view, pidgin 
languages (or child language) have no syntax, and in fact do not count as real language. In 
my view, the proto-syntactic stages clearly show continuity with the more innovative stages 
of syntax. Not only that — my argument is that proto-syntax provides a foundation, a 
necessary stepping stone into more complex, hierarchical syntax (see especially Progovac 
2008, 2009a). Notice in this respect that Culicover & Jackendoff (2005) argue that there is 
continuity between what are typically considered to be ‘core’ syntactic phenomena and the 
‘periphery’, quirky-looking syntactic constructions, which include at least some of the root 
small clauses in (40). A reviewer wonders if non-hierarchical structures can be considered as 
syntax. My view on this is that parataxis is an important aspect/layer of syntax, upon which 
hierarchical syntax rests. For example, the wide-spread view regarding sentence building is 
that a sentence starts to unfold from a small clause, which essentially can be analyzed as a 
paratactic/exocentric structure (see discussion in the text above). This initial paratactic 
structure gets integrated into layered syntax by various syntactic processes, including Move. 
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(45)  Nothing ventured. Nothing gained. 
 
The interpretation in (45) is that nothing was ventured, and that nothing was 
gained. Cross-linguistically, falling intonation implies assertion/certainty/ 
completion, while rising intonation signals uncertainty/incompleteness (e.g., 
Burling 2005: 170). In contrast, (43) combines the two clauses into a single utter-
ance, using rising intonation as glue. In addition to intonation, concatenations 
such as (43) and (44) typically rely on iconicity of word order to express temporal 
and/or causal relations, as mentioned in section 3. Deutscher (2000) argues that 
the development of finite subordination (CP complementation) had an adaptive 
advantage of breaking away from such iconicity. Prosody and intonation are still 
used cross-linguistically to signal grammatical functions, such as interrogative 
mood in (46). When they are used in conjunction with syntactic processes, such 
as Subject–Auxiliary Inversion in (47), the result is substantial redundancy and 
robustness, hallmarks of evolutionary tinkering.  
 
(46) Mary is already at home? 
 
(47) Is Mary already at home? 
 
 Intonation and prosody, which are modulated analogically, rather than 
discretely, have been proposed by many to have been available before syntax, 
given that they have significant analogs in other species (e.g., Deacon 1997, 
Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka 2004, and Burling 2005). Also, intonation and 
prosody may remain intact even in cases of severe lexico-syntactic deficits (confa-
bulatory paraphasia and jargon aphasia: Wernicke 1874, Broca 1878, Joanette et al. 
1990, Brain & Bannister 1992, Pulvermüller 2002). According to Deacon (1997), 
speech prosody is essentially a mode of communication that provides a parallel 
channel to speech; it is recruited from ancestral call functions. Like these systems, 
prosodic features are primarily produced by the larynx and lungs, and not articu-
lated by the mouth and tongue. But unlike calls of other species, prosodic vocal 
modification is continuous and highly correlated with the speech process 
(Deacon 1997: 418); the human larynx must be controlled from higher brain 
systems involved in skeletal muscle control, not just visceral control (243). It is as 
though we have not so much shifted control from visceral to voluntary means 
but superimposed intentional cortical motor behaviors over autonomous sub-
cortical vocal behaviors.  
 Of note here is also that many RootSC types, in particular the incredulity 
RootSCs such as Me worry?! (see (40)) are characterized by exaggerated into-
nation, possibly compensating for the lack of functional categories, and tapping 
into the proto-linguistic ability to create clauses using prosody/intonation as the 
only glue.  
 In conclusion, postulating a paratactic stage in the evolution of syntax is 
consistent with, and supported by, the ‘living fossils’ of this stage found in 
modern languages (RootSCs and their paratactic combinations, as discussed 
above), as well as by the neurological and comparative studies of intonation and 
prosody. Section 5 provides some further corroborating evidence. As illustrated 
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above, neither RootSCs nor their combinations can be manipulated by Move. 
This is consistent with my proposal that constructions that do not allow Move are 
evolutionarily primary, and those that allow Move evolutionary innovations.  
 
4.2. Proto-Coordination Stage  
 
As pointed out in the previous section, paratactic combinations rely solely on 
supra-segmental information to provide evidence of merger. Following this 
argument, one can see conjunctions as segments providing all-purpose segmental 
glue to hold an utterance together. This would be a stage in which a functional 
category emerged, a proto-coordinator, whose sole purpose was to hold the 
utterance together by more than just prosodic means, consolidating Merge. The 
proto-coordination stage most probably built upon the paratactic stage by adding 
a segment (conjunction) to the already existing intonation, providing now two 
indicators of Merge, one segmental and one supra-segmental.25 It would have 
been only later that such proto-coordinators differentiated into specific functional 
categories, such as aspect markers, tense markers, or complementizers (section 
4.3). Needless to say, the proposal in this section is speculative in nature, and the 
data presented below are merely suggestive of this possibility.  
 A reviewer points out that there may have been other advantages to the 
emergence of (proto-)conjunctions, such as the ability to now use different types 
of conjunctions, not just the neutral connective ‘and’. As pointed out in Payne 
(1985: 9) and references cited there, in languages such as Vietnamese and 
Japanese, a coordinator is used for the adversative conjunction (e.g., ‘but’), even 
though in non-adversatives the strategy involves simple juxtaposition of the 
conjuncts with no intervening conjunction.26 This state of affairs also points to the 
continuity/fluidity between adjunction and conjunction. According to Payne, the 
paratactic strategy, where the conjuncts are simply juxtaposed, with no 
additional markers of conjunction, is probably available to all languages. In many 
                                                       
    25  My initial formulation was that segmental glue (conjunction) provides a more robust 
cohesive mechanism than intonation. A reviewer takes issue with this and suggests that 
intonation can be considered as a morpheme, and a conjunction is also just a morpheme. 
Even if the reviewer’s suggestion is correct, the point remains that the proto-coordination 
stage utilizes two mechanisms for identifying Merge, intonation and conjunction, and two 
mechanisms will necessarily yield more robust evidence for Merge than just one of them 
alone. Present-day yes–no questions tend to keep the rising intonation even in the presence 
of segmental/syntactic evidence for interrogative mood (see examples (46)–(47) in the text.) 
But I also doubt that intonation/prosody in paratactic constructions (e.g., (43)), or in yes-no 
questions such as (46) in the text, can be considered as morphemes. For one thing, this kind 
of paratactic/interrogative intonation is not language specific, but seems to occur as a 
device across unrelated languages; if it is a morpheme, it would be some kind of universal 
morpheme. Second, if prosody signaling e.g. paratactic attachment were a morpheme, then 
this morpheme would have a rather unspecified meaning, given the range of interpretation 
possibilities it can have (see section 3). Moreover, prosody/intonation typically stretches 
over the whole utterance, which would also not be typical of a morpheme. But, clearly, into-
nation/prosody of the kind used in parataxis/question formation shows some continuity 
with modern cases of suprasegmental morphemes, such as tone in tone languages.  
    26  One also finds combination of both the neutral conjunction (‘and’) and an adversative 
conjunction (e.g., English and yet and Standard Arabic wa lakin ‘and but’, as noted in Payne 
(1985: 15), suggesting that the neutral coordinator can serve as a mere connector, without a 
specified meaning (see section 3 for similar conclusions regarding parataxis). 
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languages, such as for example, Turkish, it is a normal alternative, existing side 
by side with other strategies. The classical languages, including Sanskrit and 
Latin (cf. Veni, vidi, vici ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’) also widely permit the juxta-
position strategy for coordination (Payne 1985: 25).  
 Notice also that several recent accounts of coordination invoke adjunction 
as an integral part of the analysis. For example, Munn (1993) proposes that the 
second conjunct right adjoins (with its &P) to the first conjunct, while Kayne 
(1994) argues that the first conjunct left adjoins to the &P containing the second 
conjunct. Coordination as adjunction has also been explored by, for example, 
Schwartz (1989a, 1989b) for comitative/asymmetric conjunct (second conjunct in 
asymmetric coordination).27 In several other respects as well, the conjunction is a 
head unlike other functional heads, falling somewhere between adjunction and 
subordination (see Progovac 2003 for an overview of various analyses that 
reduce coordination to adjunction, or vice versa). Considerations like this give 
credence to the gradualist evolutionary approach, for they provide evidence of 
continuity and overlap between stages.  
 Relevant to this discussion is also the existence of the so-called ‘fillers’ in 
language acquisition. Some children acquiring various languages use such fillers 
in their first multi-word utterances, typically in places where one would expect 
functional categories (e.g., auxiliaries or determiners). These fillers are reported 
to be closely tied to prosody, particularly rhythm and melody, although there is 
no unified approach to describing fillers (see Braine 1963, 1976, Bloom 1970, 
Dressler & Karpf 1995, Peters 1999, and Veneziano & Sinclair 2000). Initially, such 
fillers may be undifferentiated in form and occur in various positions, but later 
they become more specialized for the position (from Peters & Menn 1993):   
 
(48) [m] pick [ə] flowers   (English, age 1;6) 
 
Very tentatively — these fillers might correspond to proto-conjunctions/proto-
functional categories (see section 5 for the relationship between EVO (evolution 
in species) and DEVO (development in children)).  
 Predication may have also gone through a proto-coordination stage. 
German incredulity RootSCs take an optional conjunction (Potts & Roeper 2006, 
Progovac 2006, 2009b): 
 
(49) Ich  (und)  Angst haben?       German 
 I  (and)  fear  have.INF 
 ‘Me afraid?!’ 
 
Akkadian, a Semitic language spoken between c. 2,500 to 500 BC, used the co-
ordinative particle –ma in predicative functions (50) (Deutscher 2000: 33f.). The 
                                                       
    27  One example of such a transitional comitative construction is the following Russian 
sentence from Crockett (1976): 
 
  (i)  [my            s    Petej]  poedem segodnja  za    gorod. 
      1PL-NOM  with  Peter-INSTR will-go    today        beyond city 
    ‘I and Peter will go to the country today.’ 
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absence of verbal copula possibly suggests the use of RootSCs: 
 
(50) ‘napišti  māt-im   eql-um-ma       Akkadian 
  soul.of land.GEN  field.NOM.CONJ 
 ‘The soul of the land is the field.’ 
 
In addition, Bowers (1993) analyzes English as as a realization of the head of PrP 
(Predication Phrase): 
 
(51)  She regards [SC Mary as a fool/crazy.] 
 
Of note here is that English as (and Akkadian –ma) can serve as glue for both 
predication (interclausally, as in (51)) and to connect clauses (extraclausally, as in 
(52)):   
 
 (52)  a. Peter will be late, as will John. 
 b. As she was approaching, the door opened.  
 
Note also that as is used to solidify/cement predication only in small clauses, 
where, arguably, there are no other functional projections that can do the job.  
 As pointed out in fn. 20, Jordens (2002: 741, 750) has argued that Dutch 
children pass through a stage which is characterized by the use of proto-
functional categories, which are syntactically adjoined, rather than integrated 
into the head/complement structure (his ‘conceptual-ordering’ stage). These 
proto-functional categories, according to Jordens, are linking elements between 
the topic and the predicate (p. 744). In the next, ‘finite-linking stage’, these proto-
functional words are grammaticalized into auxiliaries, which now serve as heads 
in head-complement structures (p. 750). This would mark the beginning of the 
specific functional category stage, as discussed in the following subsection.  
 In sum, this section hypothesizes that (proto-)conjunctions may have been 
the first functional categories to emerge, for the primary purpose of solidifying 
Merge, that is, of providing more robust (duplicated) evidence of Merge than just 
supra-segmentals can do. If ‘and’ emerged as a default connector, as a proto-
functional category, then it is not surprising that ‘and’ exhibits exceptional 
behavior in comparison to the other functional categories. Finally, if Merge was 
advantageous to our ancestors, then providing robust and unambiguous 
evidence of Merge would have constituted a clear and concrete advantage, which 
could have been targeted by natural/sexual selection.  
 
4.3. Specific Functional Category Stage 
 
Finally, such particles/conjunctions could have grammaticalized into specific 
functional categories, such as predication head or tense head or complementizer 
— another syntactic breakthrough and the beginning of modern syntax, which 
can now not only use functional words as glue to connect words/phrases/ 
clauses, but which can also use them to build specialized functional projections, 
such as TP/IP or CP, which now both motivate and facilitate Move. A modern 
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functional category such as a modal verb, or a complementizer, can be seen as 
providing not only segmental glue/evidence of Merge, but also, simultaneously, 
an expanded structural space, as well as additional nuances of meaning. It may 
well be that the innovation of Move coincided with the introduction of special-
ized functional categories, which both serve as landing sites for Move, and as 
‘probes’ (triggers) for Move.  
 Given this view, one can expect to find transitional constructions, those 
straddling the boundary between coordination and subordination, and such are 
not difficult to find. To take one example, the most neutral, prototypical of con-
junctions, ‘and’, can express subordinating relationships, such as consequence: 
 
 (53)  a. Give him an inch, and he will take an ell. 
(Oxford English Dictionary) 
     b. Speak one word, and you are a dead man! 
(Oxford English Dictionary) 
     c. One more can of beer and I am leaving. 
(Culicover & Jackendoff 2005: 474) 
        
In (53) above, the relationship between the two clauses is best paraphrased as 
involving a conditional, if–then sequence. Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 474) call 
this use of and ‘left-subordinating and’. 
 Of course, the functional category stage may have divided into finer-
grained sub-stages, as pointed out by a reviewer. Perhaps there was a stage in 
which aspect was grammaticalized, but not tense yet. Perhaps there was a stage 
in which TP could be built, but not CP yet (see also the discussion regarding 
proto-Indo-European in section 3). Perhaps gender/number agreement (e.g., on 
participles) emerged before person agreement (see Progovac 2008).28 Perhaps a 
stage where the verb takes only one argument (intransitive stage) emerged before 
a transitive stage. But my primary focus in this article is on the first two hypo-
thetical stages, paratactic and coordination stages, on envisioning what our 
grammars might have looked like in those initial stages, and how these initial 
stages may have provided the foundation for building layered syntax. My 
purpose was also to show how postulating these hypothetical stages can shed 
light on the quirks and complexities of present-day syntax.  
 Another question that arises is whether the advent of functional categories 
automatically leads to a hierarchical, subordination stage. In this respect, 
Kiparsky (1968) has argued convincingly that proto-Indo-European syntax was 
characterized by optional adverbial temporal particles, which did not build TPs. 
It is really the emergence of functional heads which take complements, and 
which build their own functional projections, that constitutes the hierarchical 
breakthrough. This leads to layers and layers of hierarchical structure, which can 
now be connected by Move. In other words, it is not a temporal adverbial particle 
adjoined to a SC that creates hierarchical syntax; it is a TP superimposed over the 
SC, which moreover may interact with the subject of the small clause by attract-
ing it to its own specifier by Move (Progovac 2008).  
                                                       
    28 Boeckx (2008: 119) suggests that Agree may have emerged after Merge.  
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 The gradualist approach to the development of syntax sketched in this 
section, which assumes a progression in stages, guided by natural/sexual 
selection, is in the spirit of the general vision outlined in Pinker & Bloom (1990). 
Pinker & Bloom assume the Baldwin Effect for syntax, the process whereby 
environmentally-induced responses set up selection pressures for such responses 
to become innate, triggering conventional Darwinian evolution (see also Hinton 
& Nowlan 1987 and Deacon 1997).29 Tiny selective advantages are sufficient for 
evolutionary change: According to Haldane (1927), a variant that produces on 
average 1 per cent more offspring than its alternative allele would increase in 
frequency from 0.1 per cent to 99.9 per cent of the population in just over 4,000 
generations. This would still leave plenty of time for language to have evolved: 
3.5–5 million years, if early Australopithecines were the first talkers, or, as an 
absolute minimum, several hundred thousand years, in the unlikely event that 
early Homo Sapiens was the first (Stringer & Andrews 1988). In addition, sexual 
selection can trigger a runaway effect, which can speed the process up signifi-
cantly (Fisher 1930; see also Miller 2000 and Hurford 2007). Also, fixations of 
different genes can go in parallel. 
 A reviewer wonders if my third, subordination stage may not have 
coincided with the postulation of the ‘Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition/ 
revolution’, around 43–35,000 BP (before present), based on some recent 
archeological findings. According to Mellars (2002) and others, this period was 
characterized by major changes, all reflecting shifts in many different dimensions 
of human culture and adaptation: New forms and complexity of stone, bone and 
other tools; explosion of explicitly decorative or ornamental items; represen-
tational art carving of animal and human figures; increase in human population 
densities.30 To many this ‘symbolic explosion’ is exactly what one might antici-
pate from a major shift in the structure of complexity of language patterns, 
possibly associated with corresponding shifts in the neurological structure of the 
human brain (Mellars 1991: 35, Bickerton 1995, Pinker 1995, Mithen 1996). Many 
see this explosion as potentially indicative of the emergence of relatively complex 
language patterns (Mellars 1991: 41). Klein (2000) has pointed out that there is no 
way that we can exclude the possibility of relatively sudden punctuational 
                                                       
    29 Many evolutionists have adopted the Baldwin effect as an evolutionary force, including 
Dawkins (1999) and Deacon (1997). Pinker & Bloom (1990) and Briscoe (e.g., 2000) have 
applied it to language evolution. However, as pointed out by a reviewer, Longa (2006) 
questions the Baldwin effect for language evolution, as well as for evolution in general. He 
argues that the effect lacks empirical support, and that some authors who invoke it conflate 
it with the Waddington’s effect, wrongly. Longa’s point is that the Baldwin effect cannot be 
conflated with Waddington’s effect because the two differ with respect to the timing at 
which a mutation occurs. With the Baldwin effect, he argues, the mutation necessarily 
occurs after the environmental change, while with Waddington’s effect, the mutation was 
present even before the environmental effect. As far as I can see, my data and analysis are 
consistent with the preexisting mutation scenario. Suppose that an innovation occurs in a 
community: For example, one or two people begin to merge words by using (proto-) 
conjunctions. Suppose, further, that this innovation becomes useful for survival, or perhaps 
attractive to the opposite sex. Those who have a pre-existing mutation which facilitates the 
use of language in this way will leave more offspring than the others, contributing to the 
spread of the mutation.  
    30  In fact, an increase in population size may have itself accelerated sexual selection with 
respect to language, due to more competition. 
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developments in human behavior and mentality, potentially as a result of either 
major population bottlenecks or of genetic mutations influencing the structure of 
the brain.  
 These findings are often interpreted to mean that language (or syntax) in its 
entirety arose through one single gigantic event, such as a mutation (Hauser et al. 
2002, Chomsky 2005, Fitch et al. 2005). However, even in Klein’s and Mellar’s 
work, the suggestion is only that more complex forms of language might have 
coincided with this event. So, in a gradualist evolutionary framework, it could 
have been the stage which introduced the first proto-coordinator, or it could have 
been the emergence of the subordination stage, which includes the CP projection. 
In this scenario, protolanguage could have existed, and could have been 
evolving, for a long time before that. But it is also difficult to exclude even the 
possibility that complex language, comparable to present-day languages, was in 
use for a long time before any cultural revolution took place. Definitive 
conclusions in this regard are especially difficult to draw given the common 
assumption, based on present-day cultures, that it is possible to have a highly 
complex language in the absence of any complex culture.31   
 
 
5. Some Corroborating Evidence 
 
Language acquisition arguably likewise begins with a root small clause stage (or 
root infinitive stage) (e.g., Radford 1988, 1990, Lebeaux 1989, Platzak 1990, 
Ouhalla 1991, Jordens 2002; see Guasti 2002 for many more references and also 
for opposing views). Also, subordination and CP, as well as Move, seem to 
emerge later in children. According to Studdert–Kennedy (1991) and Rolfe (1996), 
present-day views of ontogeny/phylogeny warrant the use of ontogeny, devel-
opment in children, to corroborate hypotheses about phylogeny, development in 
species.32 The emergence of TP/IP and CP in phylogeny, just as it does in onto-
geny, would have created opportunities for specialization and division of labor 
among small clauses, TPs/IPs, and CPs, leading to many complexities of syntax.  
 Agrammatism is another potential source of corroborating evidence. Kolk 
(2006, and many references there) argues that with Dutch and German agram-
matic speakers, preventive adaptation results in a bias to select simpler types of 
                                                       
    31  In addition, the significance of one of the archeological findings, the use of decorative/ 
ornamental items, needs to be reevaluated in the context of some non-humans, such as 
bower birds, who build intricate homes, and decorate them extensively, most probably in 
order to attract females. As mentioned in Miller (2000), males that build superior bowers can 
mate up to ten times a day with different females. It is possible that decorating in humans 
was also done for sexual attraction purposes (see fn. 30). In any event, human language and 
symbolic thought, which is often associated with it, do not seem to be necessary prerequi-
sites for elaborate decorating.   
    32  For some old and some recent views on the relationship between ontogeny/DEVO 
(development in children) and phylogeny/EVO (development in species), see also Ridley 
(1993), Fitch (1997), Carroll (2005), Locke & Bogin (2006), Locke (2009). As mentioned in 
Ridley, the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny has been a classic question in 
evolutionary studies, even though strict recapitulationist views are no longer held. Given 
these considerations, I am assuming here that any parallelism provides some corroborating 
evidence, even though clearly not decisive proof.  
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constructions, often sub-sentential (including root small clauses and root 
infinitives). These clauses show morphology and basic word order (with no 
Move), distinct from what one finds in finite clauses: 
 
(54) a. Koffie drinken.         Dutch  
  coffee  drink.INF 
 b.  Portemonnai  verloren 
  wallet    lost.PAST-PART 
 c. Tedereen naar buiten     
  everybody to  outside 
 
Whereas control speakers produced 10% non-finite clauses, aphasics produced 
about 60%. In children, the overuse of non-finite clauses decreased with age: 
from 83% in the 2-year-olds, to 60% in the 2.5-year-olds, to 40% in the 3-year-
olds. Recent computational and brain-imaging work indicates that the selection 
of these sub-sentential forms is task dependent, arguably used to prevent 
computational overload. A PET study by Indefrey et al. (2001) shows that non-
finite clauses require less grammatical work. The use of subordination/CP is also 
affected in agrammatic patients (see, e.g., the ‘tree-pruning approach’ of Fried-
mann & Grodzinsky 1997 and Friedmann 2002).  
 The data introduced in the previous sections, the ‘living fossils’ of syntax, 
are characteristically formulaic/stereotypical expressions (e.g., Case closed; Me 
first; Nothing ventured, nothing gained). According to, for example, Code (2005: 
317), non-propositional, stereotypical/formulaic uses of language might 
represent fossilized clues to the evolutionary origins of human communication, 
given that their processing involves more ancient processing patterns, including 
more involvement of the basal ganglia, thalamus, limbic structures, and the right 
hemisphere (see, e.g., Lieberman 2000 for an extensive argument that subcortical 
structures, basal ganglia in particular, play a crucial role in syntax). Basal-limbic 
structures are phylogentically old and the aspects of human communication 
associated with them are considered to be ancient, too (van Lancker & 
Cummings 1999, Bradshaw 2001). For example, a stroke to the right basal ganglia 
can lead to the loss of overlearned/formulaic speech, including swearwords, 
prayers, and counting (Speedie et al. 1993, van Lancker & Cummings 1999). 
Robinson (1972) proposed that two levels of the human nervous system are 
responsible for speech/language: An older system, and a newer cortical system. 
These considerations are consistent with the gradualist approach to syntax 
explored in this article.  
  
 
6.  Conclusion: Back to Subjacency 
 
This article has concluded that syntactic islands do not form a natural class, but 
that non-islands do, and that, for this reason, there can never be a principled 
account of islandhood/Subjacency. My proposal is that Subjacency is not a 
specific principle of syntax, but rather the default state of syntax, dating back in 
time to the evolutionary beginnings of language, in which Move was unavail-
able. I have hypothesized two intermediate stages in the development of syntax, 
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in which Move (e.g., across clause boundaries) was unavailable: The adjunction/ 
parataxis stage (à la Jackendoff 1999, 2002), and the coordination stage. In this 
view, Move and subordination are later innovations, probably made possible by 
the emergence of specialized functional categories and their projections, such as 
TP and CP. Various syntactic constructions in present-day use still preserve the 
state of syntax lacking Move, giving an illusion of Subjacency.  
 My proposal reverses the direction of syntactic evolution hypothesized in 
Newmeyer (1991), who also explores a gradualist approach. While Newmeyer 
assumes that the initial stages of syntax were characterized by Move free of 
Subjacency, I propose exactly the opposite, that islandhood (or the state with No 
Move) was the norm in the previous stages, and that Move was an innovation. 
This reversal allows me to kill three birds with one stone. First, it provides some 
rationale for characterizing islandhood/Subjacency as the default state of gram-
mar, rather than as a constraint on grammars. Second, this allows me to explain 
the existence of various fossilized expressions (arguably ‘living fossils’ of this 
proto-syntax stage), which cannot be manipulated by Move.  
 Third, and most importantly, this allows me to address the question of how 
or why the progression took place from the proto-syntactic stages with no Move 
and no subordination, to the stage(s) with Move and subordination. Instead of 
targeting the abstract and obscure Subjacency by natural/sexual selection, as in 
Newmeyer’s (1991) proposal, my proposal targets the emergence of subordin-
ation (Move emerging in conjunction with it). In comparison to its more primary 
counterparts, adjunction and coordination, subordination provides a clear and 
concrete advantage in the expressive power. One such advantage is that subordi-
nation, and only subordination (57), affords the possibility to recursively embed 
multiple viewpoints one within another, as seen in these repeated examples: 
 
(55) [As you know,] [as Mary knows,] he is a linguist.     Adjunction 
 
(56)  He is a linguist, [and you know it,] [and Mary knows it].  Coordination 
 
(57)  You know [that Mary knows [that he is a linguist]].    Subordination 
 
This communicative advantage is concrete enough that it could have been 
targeted by natural or sexual selection.  
 This article offers a hypothesis which is consistent with a lot of language 
data, with how grammaticalization processes work, as well as with many studies 
in language acquisition and processing. Moreover, this proposal offers a recon-
struction of how communicative/functional benefits may have been involved in 
shaping the formal design of language itself. Finally, an important advantage of 
this proposal is that it does not force us into conclusion that syntax is all or 
nothing, and that the evolution of syntax as a whole had to have been a sudden, 
passive, and inexplicable event, inexplicable in the sense that the nature of its 
evolution has nothing to do with its design. The approach explored here leaves 
open the possibility that syntax played an active role in evolving human beings. 
If we do not explore this kind of approach, in order to prove it or disprove it, we 
will never know. 
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